Abstract. The Talmud Division is a very old method of sharing developed by the rabbis in the Talmud and brought to the fore in the modern area some authors, among them are Aumann and Maschler. One compares the Talmud Division to other methods, mainly here the most popular, Aristotle's Proportional Division, but also to the equal division. The Talmud Division is more egalitarian than the Proportional Division for small levels of estate and conversely and it protects the weakest -those who cannot place a non-zero claim-. This suggests that claimants may choose among the claiming methods depending on their interest, what implies a metagame. Unlike other methods as the Proportional Division, the Talmud Division is not robust because the solution depends on the order in which groups of claimants are formed, while it could be impossible to form coalitions without following the increasing order of claimants or to find a general agreement about what precise coalition must be chosen. For a larger number of claimants, fulfilling the order-preserving condition may oblige to backtrack for a very large number of steps what implies an unreasonable volume of computations. The paper discusses also of three generalizations of the Contested Garment method to three or more claimants.
Introduction
Historically, there are three main methods (or rules) to share a given quantity of commodity between two people: the equal division, which is obvious, Aristotle's Proportional Division (Rackham 1934; see comments in Kraut 2005) and the Talmud Division, that is, the "contested garment rule". Actually, many other methods are possible (Young 1987; Dagan et al. 1997; Moulin 2002 Moulin , 2003 Thomson 2003; Balinski 2005 ) but they are not considered here. All methods are more than two thousand years old. The sharing may concern bankruptcy with each creditor being a claimant (as in Aumann and Maschler's paper), or it may concern actors being paid a percentage from admission charges to see a movie, or shareholders receiving corporate dividends, etc. The important idea is that claims may be unequal but they are given. For these examples, our contemporary reflex would be to make a sharing on a pro-rata basis or to make an equal sharing. But it is the great merit of some recent papers (O'Neill 1982; Aumann and Maschler 1985; Young 1987; Benoit 1997; Dagan et al. 1997; Herrero and Villar 2001; Aumann 2002; Moulin 2002 Moulin , 2003 Thomson 2003; Hokari and Thomson 2003; Moreno-Ternero and Villar 2004; Dominguez and Thomson 2006) 1 is to show that the contested garment rule could be also chosen. Even if the equal division and the proportional division are better known and more common, the Talmud method is also interesting and is not just in an historical perspective. It allows a completely different sharing of a given estate between claimants. The key point of this paper consists into examining if the Talmud Division is a method that could be utilized in the real world for the many sharing problem that may occur or if it is only an interesting but historically anecdotic method.
2 1 Dagan et al. (1997, p. 58) indicate that the method has also been studied by Pineles (1861) , unfortunately for us in a text in Hebrew, not translated. 2 This paper is no way critical of the Jewish Talmud or the Ketubot: no disrespect is intended to the very ancient Jewish religion. The paper discusses the merits and demerits of this fascinating method of division that can be deduced from the Talmud and the Ketubot, as exposed initially by O'Neill (1982) and Aumann and Maschler (1985) . We know that two or three thousand years ago, mathematics was in its infancy and the authors and ancient commentators of the Talmud were in no position to make the deductions that we can do nowadays. Aumann and Maschler's paper is very instructive about the attempts at making a logical interpretation of the Talmud law of division.
One is able to compare the three methods by respect to equality and equity between claimants. Depending on the level of the total claimed, one method may be more favorable than the other for one claimant but less favorable for the other claimant. This opens the door for a game, which may be termed a metagame because it is a type of game played on the objectives. This is the subject of section 2. For three claimants or more, things are more complicated. The claimants are grouped into two groups -one alone and the other in one group-and the estate is shared between the two groups, then the group is subdivided into two, and so on. This poses the question of how the groups are made, in what order etc., remembering that the problem is combinatory, what poses the question of robustness. This is the subject of section 3. Section 4 is devoted to larger examples, with more than three claimants while section 5 discusses the possibility of generalizing the Contested garment method. Section 1 is this introduction. Section 6 concludes.
Equality, equity and metagame

Reminder
The traditional Talmudic writings consider the so-called contested garment problem:
two persons claim for a garment, one the whole garment, the other half of the garment. The Knowing that the Proportional Division implies the continuation of inequalities and that the Equal Division may be considered as wronging the strongest claimant, one deduces of these obvious findings that the Talmud Division tends to correct the repartition to the benefit of the weakest claimant when the estate is low, that is, in case of shortage: this should be considered as satisfactory in a morale point of view. (2002) ), that is, it conserves the inequality that can be observed before (that is, in the claims) and after distribution:
for all i, j. The Proportional Division is also known to be order preserving; it does not affect inequality because proportionality remains always. Moreover, it may be noticed that the Talmud Division does not allow sharing if the estate is unknown ex ante while this is not so with the Proportional Division (as the division is always proportional to the claims, the estate will be shared ex post in these proportions).
Where is equity? This will be discussed for two claimants in order to compare the Talmud Division to other methods, focusing on the most popular, the Proportional Division.
As pointed out by Aumann and Maschler (1985, p. 199) , the individuals' claims may or may not be valid (see a very subtle analysis in Moulin (2002) ). In a case of bankruptcy, the claims are always valid (and hence, given) because they are financial claims generated by the debts of a debtor and the claimants are relatively passive regarding the amount of debts that remain to be paid when bankruptcy occurs: in this case, the claims are what they are and their amount cannot be discussed. However, in some other cases, the validity of the claims can be discussed. In this case, each one could want to take the whole: if one individual claims less than the total, it is because he is weak or uninformed, unable to make a claim freely. The situations where the claims are free, at least for one of the claimants, the other being weak or not, will be discussed now.
If both agents can freely make their claims (hence, neither is weak), a good strategy with the Talmud Division consists in claiming the whole estate E (demanding more serves no purpose); but if both individuals do this, each one receives E If only one agent j is free to claim, with the Proportional Division, whoever claims nothing always receives nothing, while whoever claims a lot receives a lot: the weak are not protected. By contrast, the Talmud Division seems to correct the imbalance between the individuals. Whoever makes an excessive claim receives less than the total available: he is compelled to give up something to the other individual; whoever claims nothing receives a little, what is equitable. This is close to the idea of securement (Moreno-Ternero and Villar, 2004) : "… securement says that any agent holding a feasible claim (a claim not larger than the estate) will get at least one nth of her claim, where n is the number of agents involved"; see also Dominguez and Thomson (2006) . However, this is true only if the other individual does not claim all the estate: if j demands everything while i claims nothing, i receives zero:
in Figure 1 , the points ( )
are projected on themselves; this is the only situation where a claimant receives nothing with the Talmud Division.
All this opens the door for a metagame where claimants may choose their methods of division depending of their own interest.
Metagame
Scholars generally suppose that the method is given and that claimants share between them following this method: the choice of a method is not in question, only how much each claimant receives is examined. If we return to Figure 2 , we can see that for
: segment CF contains all feasible allocations. to claimant 2: it amounts to using a method of division which is the average between the Talmud Division and the Proportional Division.
However, there is a big difference with the bilateral monopoly: in the problem of division, firstly, nobody has anything in his hand before dividing and secondly, choosing any method of division, even the least advantageous, will increase the welfare of both. Hence, the claimants must share anyway, contrarily to the bilateral monopoly, but if they are ultimately unable to agree on a common method of division, there is under-optimality. All these analyses conducted for two claimants concerning equality, inequality, equity and metagame seem rather elementary and thinking about more claimants could seem more satisfactory but we will see that there is a large impossibility for three claimants or more, unfortunately.
Robustness in the Three-Wives problem
The Contested garment case concerns two claimants: a method of division limited to only two claimants is just a toy. A real method must be able to handle many claimants: the Talmud method concerns also three claimants (the Three-Wives problem) but for three claimants or more, things are more complicated.
The Talmud uses a definite order of coalitions. Aumann and Maschler (1985) have made explicit the Talmud Division for more than two claimants: the coalitions that are not order-preserving are rejected; they term the new procedure the coalitional procedure. Aumann and Maschler (1985) give a formalization of this procedure termed as the orderly step-by-step process although I would prefer orderly sequential coalitions. After ordering the claims in increasing order, that is, ... 0
, the first claimant forms a first group alone and the other claimants a second group: the division is done between both groups; then the second claimant forms a group alone while the 3 rd up to the n th claimants form a second group, the division being done between both groups as before; etc.
The question is: how individuals are grouped in the Talmud Division, while for the Proportional Division, this question obviously does not matter. As far I know, never Aumann and Maschler or any followers have developed the idea, at least in a published paper but they suggest that some further studies must be conducted. Here, we want to examine the question. We define robustness as the following property: a method of division is robust if the shares that solve the problem do not depend on how claimants are grouped and in what order they are grouped.
7
The Talmud examines the case of a man who has three wives; the contracts of marriage say that each woman should receive 100, 200 and 300 at its death. The man dies but its estate is only 100: each wife receives 3 100 . The Talmud says also that if the estate would have been equal to 200, they should receive 50, 75 and 75 while if it would be 300, they should receive 50, 100 and 150. Aumann et Maschler (1985) show that this result is found by grouping first wives 2 et 3 together and by sharing between this group and wife 1 then by sharing between the wives 2 and 3. Hence, a particular order is chosen, the coalitional procedure. 6 The following quotation shows that Aumann and Maschler new the importance of the order of formation of coalitions, and that the results depend of the particular choice of starting from the poorest claimant (Aumann and Maschler, 1987, p. 207) : "Theorem C applies the CG principle [i.e., Talmud Division] to pairs of coalitions; and it describes an orderly step-by-step process (the rule of sequential coalitions), which by its very definition must lead to a unique result. But it uses only certain carefully selected pairs of coalitions, not all such pairs. As described -with the coalitions { } 1 and { } n ,..., 2 -the coalitional procedure yields a monotonic rule and order-preserving solutions. Moreover, it appears that they are the only such coalitions, though we have no satisfactory formulation and proof of such a result. Also, it appears that if the creditors may form coalitions as they wish, then for 2 D E ≤ , the incentives lead to the coalition suggested by the coalitional procedure.
These matters call for further study". 7 If the groups are coalitions, the idea of robustness is closed the idea of coalition-proof in the sense of Bernheim et al. (1987) .
Three different coalitions
The choice of a particular order in the sequential procedure of coalitions is obviously arbitrary because some other ways of grouping are possible: the claimants can choose to form various coalitions as they wish (e.g. 1 and 2 versus 3, or 1 and 3 versus 2, or 2 and 3 versus 1), what changes the result and is not always order-preserving.
Coalition {2,3} against 1 (the Talmudic problem of the Three Wives)
When it is applied to the estate division problem (wives 1, 2 and 3 claiming respectively 100, 200 and 300), wives 2 and 3 form a group versus wife 1, then wives 2 and 3 share between them. The allocations must be order preserving for awards and losses; if not the process is stopped and what remains is affected equally between the remaining claimants.
It is for example the case if the estate is equal to 100 (the process is stopped at the first step because the orderly step-by-step process would give 50 for claimant 1 and only 50 for the two other, that is, ( )
, what is not order preserving for the awards). It is also the case when the estate is equal to 500 (the process is also stopped at the first step: the orderly stepby-step process would lead to a loss of 50 for the first claimant and of 50 for the two others, that is, an allocation of ( ) do not need to apply the special equality rule). Table 4 . The Talmudic marriage problem: summary A coalition i dominates a coalition j for a given claimant if the awards given by i are never lower than the awards given by j (but may be equal sometimes). We will say that any claimant prefers choosing a dominating coalition, although it can be equivalent to another for particular levels of estate. Fortunately, the problem exposed above for coalition 1-3 and its 
Dominance between coalitions
. We can say that claimant 1 never prefers being in a coalition with claimant 2 but is indifferent between the two other cases, namely being alone and being with claimant 3; claimant 2 prefers being with claimant 3, then being alone and finally being with 1; claimant 3 prefers being alone then being with 1, then being with 2. This can be summarized -always for lower estates-much more compactly in the following way, by showing the order of the preferences (the numbers are those of the claimants; 0 corresponds to the case where a claimant prefers to be alone):
If we assume that the claimants may choose themselves their coalitions, we deduce that there is an obvious impossibility. Claimant 3 prefers to be alone: we may assume that he remains alone but this obliges claimants 1 and 2 to form a coalition, what is impossible because they dislike being together. If claimant 2 chooses its first best, being with 3, claimant 1 accepts to be alone (its first best equally placed) but claimant 3 is forced to choose its worse choice. If claimant 1 chooses also its first best, he can be alone but the case has been explored as being the worse for 3 or he can join 3 but this is the second best of 3 what forces 2 to choose also its second best. One observes also that the coalition { } 
3.3.The Three-Wives problem with other levels of rights
In the Talmudic Three-Wives problem, claimant 2's claim is at equal distance of the two other claims (actually, it is the mean of the two other claims (by symmetry, it is the same thing for
). The solution is conditioned by monotony.
In Table 5 , if the estate is low, that is, 2 D E ≤ , we see that for claimant 1,
Hence: : see Table 6 .
Again we experience difficulties with the special equality rule for 290 150
1 : see Annex 3. The same problem occurs with coalition { } 3 , 1 . These difficulties lead to consider intervals for the value of allocations. The results are summarized in Table 6 . . This one is also order-preserving on awards and losses but different from the previous solution. One immediately notices that the 5 th claimant, the strongest, receives more than when he was in a coalition: it might be more advantageous not to join coalitions! This is probably paradoxical.
One question arises. Why would a particular claimant reject a division advantageous for him only because it does not preserve the order of the claims? The only explanation is:
because the other claimants would also give up the coalition if they are losing in it. This is the case in the above example (2): claimant 3 could receive 150 if claimants 4 and 5 form a coalition but claimants 4 and 5 have no incentive to do this as they would lose at least 15 each by so doing; for them, it is not a matter of preserving the order or not, but a matter of not losing out.
Obtaining results that are dependent on the way the claimants are grouped is an obvious weakness of the Talmud Division: in a word, the Talmud Division is not robust while the Proportional Division is obviously known to be robust, as all global consistent methods, -"global" meaning that, for a division problem among n individuals, the result can be found by maximizing or minimizing only one time a function without any iterative or step-by-step process (which can be parametric or objective: see Young 1987)-. In the context of Jewish law (the Mishna), the given order of coalitions (from the larger claim to the lower, this one being always alone) may perfectly be taken as a fact, hence the lack of robustness but a method of division that is not always order-preserving cannot be considered as fair because it is to be expected that a fair method should yield a unique result regardless of how it is applied. Remark that the above paradoxes are not contradictory with consistency: once the order of grouping is chosen, the method is consistent, but the result varies with this order.
Larger examples pose the problem of backtracking. Consider the following example (Aumann and Maschler 1985, p. 207 . This mechanism supposes that the players may play "for fun", that is, they are able to compute all the results of the future coalitions. Here, they have to compute for two coalitions only, but for a million people, they would have to compute for an unreasonable number of coalitions.
Notice that Moulin (2003, p. 58) . It does not depend on the coalitions formed and it corresponds also to the Shapley value. This is because 2 D E = : we insist to say that it is a very special case.
Generalizing the Contested Garment
If the sequential coalitions are not a good generalization of the Contested Garment, that is, the Talmud Division for two claimants, one may wonder if it is possible to find another method, remembering that any generalization must allow retrieving the results of the two-claimants case.
The "run to the bank", that is, the Shapley value, mentioned by Moulin (2003, pp. 
Conclusion
We have compared the Talmud Division to other methods of division in terms of its tendency to maintain equality between claimants. The Talmud Division is more egalitarian than the Proportional Division for small levels of estate and conversely. The Talmud Division protects the weakest, those who cannot place a non-zero claim. This has led us to consider that claimants may want to choose the sharing methods depending on their interest, what implies that a metagame may be played: each claimant chooses the method which is more favorable for him. The Talmud Division is an attractive method of division when two claimants are considered and it may be used in the traditional cases as bankruptcy but also in those of actors being paid a percentage from admission charges to see a movie, of shareholders that receive corporate dividends or of many patrimonial problems as divorces.
When there are more than two claimants, the Talmud Division is applied sequentially. The paper has discussed also of three possible generalizations to three or more claimants of the Contested Garment method. The result is negative.
Finally, the distribution of rights between n individuals can thus be infinitely more complex than between two individuals, a case which is however often regarded as representative of the general information of the questions of allowance of rights. ; the results are indicated in Table 2 .
Annex
As the order of claimants is not preserved with the coalition 1-3, one is obliged to use the special equality rule for affecting equally the remaining awards or losses to all remaining and the other inside, while the third one, claimant 1, is determined: this solution seems ad hoc.
A reasonable solution could consist into extending the special equality rule such that we choose to keep the intervals as is in Table 6 , what has the merit to show clearly the limits of the Talmud Division when coalitions are free. 
